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 The relationship between health and well-being is a vexed one.  On the 
one hand, it seems obvious that the two go hand-in-hand.  Common sense 
tells us that illnesses, diseases, and injuries are bad for us.  We call these 
instances of  ill health, and we describe ourselves as suffering from them.  We 
worry about having health problems, and we feel sorry for those who do. 
Parents who fail to prevent sickness or disability in their children are accused 
of  harming them and are labeled negligent.  There are, of  course, some times 
we may welcome illness, disease, or injury:  the flu may get us out of  an exam 
for which we’re unprepared, asthma may excuse us from military service, and 
a broken leg from an accident may net us a large insurance settlement.  But in 
cases like these, it seems clear that each health problem is itself  a bad thing 
that merely happens to be accompanied by something good enough to 
outweigh the bad.  (We would prefer to get out of  the exam without catching 
the flu, avoid military service without asthma, and get a large sum of  money 
without breaking our leg.)  So, there seems to be a strong assumption that 
health problems reduce well-being — that is, that they are bad for the people 
who suffer from them — unless perhaps that badness is outweighed by an 
accompanying good.  2
 Not surprisingly, the academic literature generally endorses this 
assumption.  When philosophers need an example of  something that makes 
a life go worse, they frequently choose a health problem.  In discussing the 
non-identity problem, for example, Kavka uses the example of  a 
handicapped child (1982: 98; cf. Parfit 1984: 367-9), and Harman (2004) a 
deaf  child.  In contexts where health and well-being are more direct topics of  
discussion, the same assumption is stated more explicitly: !
To be disabled in any sense is not the same as being differently abled. 
Being deaf  for example is…a condition which harms the individual 
relative to freedom from deafness. (Harris 2001: 383; cf. McMahan 2005: 
96) !
 I thank Daniel Groll, Daniel Hausman, Paul Hurley, Adrienne Martin, Nicole James Ross, and Nancy 1
Schroeder for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of  this chapter.
 Throughout this chapter, I will use “X’s well-being,” “X’s welfare,” and “good for X” interchangeably. 2
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Philosophers writing on well-being sometimes include health as a constituent 
of  well-being (Kraut 2007: 132-3; Murphy 2001: 100-5; Finnis 1980: 85-6) 
and regard it as a serious objection to desire-based theories of  well-being that 
those theories don’t give health intrinsic value (Raibley 2013; Lauinger 2013). 
Most of  the epidemiological and health economic literature treats ill health as 
something of  importance primarily because of  its impact on well-being. (See 
e.g. Broome 2002; Neumann 2005: 9.)  Accordingly, the major economic 
measures used to evaluate overall health are given names like the Quality of  
Well-Being Scale, the Health Utility Index, and the EuroQoL [Quality of  
Life].  Finally, many states, such as homosexuality, that were previously 
thought to be diseases or illnesses became recognized as compatible with 
health, once we learned that they are not bad for their possessor.  3
 All of  this, then, points to a strong connection, in both everyday and 
academic discourse, between ill health and reductions in well-being. 
Diseases, injuries, and illnesses are bad for us, and that is the primary reason 
why we should be concerned about them.  Set against this, however, is what 
has been called the Disability Paradox:  many people with what most of  us 
would consider serious disabilities and health problems, such as deafness, 
paraplegia, and kidney disease, report surprisingly high levels of  well-being 
(Albrecht and Devlieger 1999; Ubel et al. 2005; Angner et al. 2013) — 
perhaps as high as the self-reported well-being of  people in full health (Riis et 
al. 2005).  Some claim they would refuse treatments to restore their health 
(Hahn and Belt 2004) and go to great expense to conceive children who 
share their condition (Sanghavi 2006).  Even if  well-being is lower for those 
in ill health, some advocates for the disabled argue that that is not because 
disabilities are themselves bad.  Rather, any reduction in well-being is 
primarily attributable to unjust social factors (Oliver 1996).  Disability is in 
this respect like being a woman, having dark skin, or being gay:  these traits 
are not in any way intrinsically bad or harmful, though in an unjust and 
discriminatory society like ours, they may in fact tend to reduce well-being. 
 What, then, should we conclude about the connection between health 
and well-being?  None of  the observations in the previous paragraph is 
sufficient to show that health isn’t tightly connected to well-being.  (Survey 
participants might misrepresent their own levels of  well-being, people in ill 
health might refuse treatments out of  a concern for something other than 
personal well-being, etc.)  But, taken together, they do give us reason to 
question the strength of  the relationship.  In the remainder of  this chapter I 
will investigate the link between health and well-being.  I will argue that for a 
 The complete explanation for how homosexuality came to be recognized as non-pathological is a 3
complex and ongoing one.  But the American Psychiatric Association’s decision, for example, to 
remove homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders (DSM-II) was in part 
motivated by research showing that most people who were gay did not experience distress or social 
impairments as a result of  their sexual orientation (Lamberg 1998).
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wide range of  health states, the connection is a contingent one.  Further, 
empirical findings suggest that decrements in health probably have much less 
impact on well-being than most people suppose.  This has important 
consequences for issues of  justice and morality. !!
PRELIMINARIES !
 Before we can look at the relationship between health and well-being, a 
few preliminaries are necessary.  First, there are no generally-accepted 
theories of  well-being or of  health.  Ideally, therefore, this chapter would 
begin by discussing the many alternative theories of  well-being and health 
that have been offered, since what relationship there is between the two may 
depend on what analysis of  those concepts we accept.  Fortunately, I think 
we can make progress without engaging in that arduous task.  In this chapter, 
I won’t take a stand on the nature of  well-being, except that I will set aside 
certain theories (mentioned above) which explicitly include health as a 
component of  well-being.  (On those theories, the relationship between 
health and well-being is straightforward.)   
 When it comes to health, I will assume that it is a matter of  proper 
functioning:  healthy eyes are eyes that work the way eyes are supposed to, a 
healthy immune system is one that works as immune systems are supposed 
to, and so forth.  Decrements in health, which include injury, illness, disease, 
and disability — or, for short, pathology — occur when part of  an organism 
is functioning improperly in a way that is in some relevant sense inferior. 
This analysis of  health is, I think, our everyday one, and it is standard in 
medical usage (Wakefield 1999) and economic analysis (Hausman 2010: 
281-2).  It is also consistent with most philosophical theories of  health. 
(What distinguishes many theories of  health is how they cash out the idea of  
“proper” functioning.  Contrast, e.g. Boorse (1997), Wakefield (1992), and 
Venkatapuram (2013).  I won’t worry about differences among these views, 
since in most ordinary cases their judgments of  pathology and health 
coincide.) 
 This general analysis of  health may seem to be controversial.  The ears 
of  a deaf  person and legs of  a paraplegic are, on any plausible account, not 
functioning properly.  Therefore, according to the above analysis, deafness 
and paraplegia are pathological.  Many advocates for the disabled, however, 
have argued that disability is compatible with health.  The U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control, for example, say, “Having a disability does not mean a 
person is not healthy or that he or she cannot be healthy” (CDC 2014).  This 
is a complex issue which I cannot fully discuss here, except to say that I 
believe such claims are often made out of  a desire to avoid certain 
implications that commonly accompany health judgments:  for example, that 
health problems call for medical treatment, or that they are undesirable 
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(Bickenbach 2013; Wendell 2001).  Note that neither of  those claims follows 
from the analysis of  health I am using.  Given that the ears of  a deaf  person 
are functioning improperly, it does not follow that the proper response is 
surgery on the ears.  It could be that the appropriate response is to change 
the environment (to make it more easily navigable for the deaf), or to do 
nothing at all.  Similarly, even if  the ears of  a deaf  person function poorly 
compared to the ears of  a hearing person, it does not follow that the life of  a 
deaf  person is in any respect worse than the life of  a hearing person.  So, 
even if  my account of  health is controversial, I believe it has the potential to 
address many of  the worries that motivate attempts to reject it. 
 This leads to the second preliminary point.  In what follows, much of  
the literature I cite concerns disability, rather than health.  That is because 
much more has been written about the relationship between disability and 
well-being than about the relationship between health and well-being.  Since 
standard examples of  disability will straightforwardly count as pathologies on 
the account of  health I am working with, we can use the literature on 
disability to draw conclusions about health.  But we should keep in mind that 
disability is only one type of  pathology.  4!!
THE EFFECTS OF ILL HEALTH !
 Ill health, or pathology, can manifest itself  in a number of  ways, but 
two seem most prominent.  First, ill health can cause pain or another 
negative phenomenological state.  Some pathologies necessarily involve this. 
You can’t have a headache without experiencing pain, and you can’t have an 
anxiety disorder without experiencing distress.  Many other pathologies, like 
bee stings and late-stage cancer, typically involve pain, but need not.  Finally, 
many pathologies, like blindness, involve no pain at all, and others, such as 
lactose intolerance, involve pain that can be avoided through medical 
intervention or behavioral modification. 
 The second way ill health manifests itself  is through limitations on what 
we can do.  This is obvious in the case of  musculoskeletal conditions (e.g. a 
broken hand) and sensory limitations.  But it is also true of  things like 
infectious diseases.  In addition to the discomfort it causes, the flu affects 
your respiratory system and causes weakness and fatigue, all of  which 
prevent you from engaging in many activities you otherwise could.  At the 
limit, health conditions that are fatal prevent us from engaging in any 
activities at all. 
 What distinguishes disability from other sorts of  pathology?  The question is a controversial one, but 4
the common understanding of  disability requires at least that disability be long-lasting and perhaps 
relatively stable over time.  So the flu, sunburns, and paper cuts would be examples of  pathologies that 
are not disabilities.
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 So, there are two primary ways that ill health affects us:  it can cause 
pain, and it can restrict our capabilities.   The connection between the former 5
and well-being is the clearer of  the two.  On nearly any account of  well-
being, pain and distress generally reduce well-being.  This is true by definition 
on a hedonic theory, but other plausible theories of  well-being will also make 
pain a detriment to well-being.  We can imagine some situations where pain 
itself  might be good — it might be good to feel distress at the loss of  a loved 
one — but the pain resulting from pathology doesn’t seem to be like this. 
There are also cases where on balance pain can be a good.  A friendship 
might be forged through shared suffering, or a painful experience might spur 
one to change one’s lifestyle for the better.  But these seem like the case of  
the flu excusing one from an exam.  The pain here is still bad; it is just 
accompanied by a good which outweighs it.   
A stronger challenge to the claim that pain is bad comes from 
Wendell:  “[L]iving with pain, fatigue, nausea, unpredictable abilities, and/or 
the imminent threat of  death creates different ways of  being that give valuable 
perspective on life and the world… Some of  us would choose to live them 
even if  they were inseparable from the suffering” (2001: 31).  If  it is true that 
there are valuable perspectives that one can gain only through pain, then this 
case may be importantly different than the flu and the exam.  The flu and the 
exam are separable in a way that pain and the associated perspective would 
not be.  At the most, though, Wendell’s example could show that pain is 
sometimes not a bad, not that it is generally good.  (Wendell seems to accept 
this.)  So I will set this argument aside, in order to turn to the other primary 
way ill health affects us:  by restricting our capabilities.  Its connection to 
well-being is much less clear. !!
RESTRICTED CAPABILITIES AND WELL-BEING !
 Focus, for now, on people living with health problems that prevent 
them from engaging in certain activities.  (We will consider mortality at the 
end of  this section.)  What is the effect of  that capability loss on a person’s 
well-being?  It may initially seem like it must be a bad thing for the person. 
After all, most of  us don’t like to have our options taken away.  But a little 
reflection shows that this needn’t be so.  Mark Twain is reported 
(erroneously, it seems)  to have said, “The man who does not read has no 6
 The idea that the two salient manifestations of  ill health are pain and restrictions on capabilities is a 5
common one, embodied in many health measurement and classification systems.  The Health Utilities 
Index (Mark 3), for example, classifies health states by their impact on two phenomenal dimensions 
(emotion and pain) and six activity dimensions (vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, dexterity, and 
cognition).
 http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/12/11/cannot-read/6
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advantage over the man who cannot read.”  As a point about well-being, this 
seems right (Silvers 2003: 479).  The well-being of  a committed vegetarian 
need not decrease due to a shellfish allergy.  So the first point to note is that 
ill health which restricts a capability that would not have been exercised need 
not have any effect on well-being.   
 This point, though, may seem to be of  limited importance.  Many 
health problems impact capabilities — movement, sight, cognition — which 
nearly everyone who is able to exercises in some way.  Does the loss of  a 
capability that a person would have exercised lead to a loss of  well-being? 
Again, it is obvious that it need not.  If  the movie you plan to see is sold out, 
the effect on your well-being will depend on what you do instead.  If  your 
second-choice movie is inferior to your first, then your well-being will 
decline.  But your second-choice movie may instead end up being more 
entertaining and enlightening than your first-choice, increasing your well-
being.  Or perhaps missing out on the movie leads you to stay home and 
catch up on housework, increasing your well-being in the long run. 
 This point may seem obvious and uninteresting.  Of  course being 
prevented from pursuing an option you would have pursued need not make 
you worse off.  Whether it does will depend on what replaces the foregone 
option.  Nevertheless, when we think about disability, our first thought is 
usually only of  the valuable activities disability can bar us from.  The blind 
person is unable to fully appreciate a brilliant painting.  The paraplegic is 
unable to play soccer.  The diabetic may not be able to enjoy an afternoon of  
wine tasting.  Art, athletic competitions, and fine wine are all things that 
many people enjoy for their own sakes.  If  disability prevents us from doing 
these things, that seems like a huge loss.  We have, after all, been barred from 
a legitimately valuable thing.  But the above reflections show that that such a 
conclusion is premature.  Before knowing whether losing access to these 
goods will reduce a person’s well-being, we need to know what she will 
replace them with.  If  they are replaced with equally valuable substitutes, 
then the person’s well-being will be unaffected.  For most of  the valuable 
things that can be taken away by disability, this seems possible.  Music and 
sculpture are no less valuable than painting.  Wheelchair basketball can be 
just as exciting and intense as soccer.  And so forth (Moller 2011: 199).  7
While it is true, therefore, that disabilities frequently exclude people from 
valuable activities and experiences, that exclusion need have no impact on 
their well-being. 
 Moller expresses concern that there may be a loss of  well-being when the substituted good does not 7
come from the same general class as the lost one.  So, he worries that not being able to hear music may 
reduce well-being.  If  there is something to Moller’s claim, it seems to me he has made the classes too 
narrow.  So long as someone who loses access to music is capable of  some form of  artistic experience, 
I see no reason to think there must be a loss of  well-being.  But this issue warrants further discussion.
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 The other main concern people have when thinking about disability is 
the impact that disability will have on activities people engage in not 
primarily for their own sake, but for other purposes.  Call these things, which 
for many people include cooking dinner, driving a car, going shopping, or 
taking a shower, instrumental activities.  When we are prevented from 
engaging in an instrumental activity, our goal usually isn’t to find an equally 
valuable alternative; it is to find an alternative way of  accomplishing the same 
goal that is comparably efficient.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that, for many 
people with disabilities, this is possible if  the environment is arranged 
properly.   (In cases where the environment isn’t arranged well -- e.g. a city 8
with no curb cuts for wheelchairs -- it may be plausible to maintain that the 
resulting reduction in well-being can be attributed primarily to unjust social 
factors, rather than to the disability itself.)  9
 What all of  this shows is that the loss of  capabilities that accompanies 
ill health need not reduce well-being.  For most lost capabilities, we can 
imagine equally valuable substitutes for activities engaged in for their own 
sake, and equally efficient means of  carrying out instrumental activities.  Of  
course, in particular circumstances the alternatives may not be available.  The 
clarinetist, forced by arthritis to resign from an orchestral career, may not be 
able to find a substitute that she finds as fulfilling.  And even when equally 
valuable substitutes are available, there is no guarantee that people will take 
advantage of  them.  The extent to which the capability loss that accompanies 
ill health reduces well-being is therefore a contingent matter.  It depends on 
how often, in fact, people are able to find equally valuable substitutes and 
equally efficient alternatives. 
 Since this is, at least in part, an empirical matter, we should turn to the 
empirical sciences for guidance.  The relevant empirical research, though, is 
difficult to interpret.  The social scientists who have studied this, usually 
 I am not aware of  any studies that attempt to document this from an academic perspective.  But a 8
large number of  books, articles, and documentaries show people with what most would consider 
serious disabilities managing instrumental activities with no more difficulty than anyone else.  Angner et 
al. (2013) sometimes appear to claim that disease disrupts daily functioning and, as a result, happiness.  
But what their study in fact shows is that people who report having their daily activities disrupted by ill 
health are less likely to be happy.  And, surprisingly, their study found that objective measures of  ill 
health were not significantly associated with disruption of  daily activities.  Thus, their study is 
consistent with the claim that many people with disabilities have little difficulty with instrumental 
activities, and accordingly no resultant loss of  happiness.
 There are also a number of  respects in which health problems may tend to improve well-being.  On 9
certain plausible views of  well-being, there is value in overcoming obstacles or accomplishing difficult 
tasks.  By providing such obstacles, ill health could increase well-being.  Illness and disability can force 
us to see the world in a different way, providing us with a valuable perspective inaccessible to those in 
good health (Wendell 2001; Barnes 2009: 341). Finally, some research suggests that people experience 
anxiety when faced with a large number of  good options (Shenhav and Buckner 2014).  By eliminating 
some valuable options, a disability could therefore reduce anxiety.  (Think of  the anxiety you might feel 
when faced with several job offers that all appear to be equally good.  If  the offers really are equally 
good, it might have been better for you to have received only one such offer.)
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called the process of  adaptation to disability and ill health, often aren’t 
sensitive to alternative theories of  well-being.  And, more importantly, well-
being is difficult to measure.   There is no consensus on what well-being is, 10
nor are there any uncontroversial, reliable indicators of  it.  That said, it seems 
likely that people unable to find good substitutes and alternatives would tend 
to report their happiness as being lower than the self-reported happiness of  
people in full health.  The best empirical studies, however, find that once they 
have had time to adapt to their state, people with a wide range of  disabilities 
report levels of  happiness much higher than expected, sometimes as high as 
the self-reported happiness of  people in full health (Riis et al. 2005). This 
continues to hold when researchers attempt to control for factors (such as 
lowered expectations, self-deception, etc.) that might tend to distort people’s 
self-reports (Ubel et al. 2005).  11
 Of  course, despite researchers’ best efforts, it is still possible that the 
self-reports are biased in some way.  And according to most theories of  well-
being, well-being is more than felt happiness, so it is possible that the well-
being of  people in ill health could be low, even if  their happiness is high. 
But these results nevertheless make a strong prima facie case that the well-
being of  people with disabilities is much higher than most people assume. 
We know that, at least in many cases, equally valuable substitutes for lost 
activities are available.  People with disabilities are telling us that they are 
happy and satisfied with their lives, suggesting that they believe they have 
found those valuable substitutes.  We should work from the (defeasible) 
assumption that they have (Goering 2008). 
 Before moving on to discuss the consequences of  this result, we should 
briefly consider death resulting from ill health.  The analysis here is quite 
simple.  We’ve seen that the loss of  capability resulting from ill health need 
not lower well-being, when good substitutes and alternatives can be found. 
But, since death involves the loss of  all capabilities, we know no such 
substitutes and alternatives will be available.  So, death will reduce well-being 
for anyone who otherwise would have experienced a life that was on balance 
good.  I will, optimistically and I hope accurately, assume that this is true of  
most premature deaths. !!
HEALTH AND JUSTICE !
 See Hausman (2015) for a discussion of  some of  these difficulties, in the context of  health.10
 I know of  no studies that attempt to determine which health problems can be most successfully 11
adapted to.  See Frederick and Loewenstein (1999), however, for a survey of  factors that can make 
successful adaptation more or less likely.  There is also some research suggesting that depression is an 
exception to the Disability Paradox:  people suffering from depression tend to rate depression as worse 
than the general public does (Pyne et al. 2009).
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 Most people think health is an important concern of  justice and even a 
basic human right (Daniels 2007: ch.2).  Most wealthy countries and many 
poorer ones provide universal health care to their citizens.  People are 
offended when they see heath inequalities within a population (Anand, Peter, 
and Sen 2004; Eyal et al. 2013).  Why does health occupy such a significant 
place in our thinking about justice?  The natural and dominant explanation is 
that health is so important because it has a large impact on well-being.  We 
need to show a special concern for health because it is a significant 
determinant of  how well people’s lives go.  Health inequalities are unjust 
because they mean that some segments of  a population are living much 
better lives than others.  We’ve seen, however, that there is reason to question 
this.  It is true that pain and premature mortality reduce well-being, but long-
term capability loss may not have a large effect on well-being.  (It often will 
have some effect, and the process of  adaption to a disability involves a 
temporary loss of  well-being.  But these losses are relatively small, compared 
to the well-being losses that most people assume accompany chronic ill 
health.)  Should we, then, say that justice requires only managing pain and 
extending life, but doesn’t require much beyond that when it comes to 
health?  Should public insurance plans stop paying for expensive surgeries to 
increase mobility or address sensory limitations? 
 To reject this conclusion — which most find extremely counterintuitive 
— we need a different justification for making health a concern of  justice 
(Loewenstein and Ubel 2008; Moller 2011; Shakespeare 2013: 100).  Two 
basic alternatives have been proposed.  The first looks to preferences.  Even 
if  people in ill health are just as happy as people in good health, we know 
that most people strongly prefer not to be in ill health.  If  justice involves 
respecting or catering to people’s preferences, then it would require working 
to prevent and reverse health problems when possible.  So far, so good.  This 
approach faces a potential problem, however.  Why do people prefer not to 
become disabled?  If  the explanation is that they think that disability would 
make them much less happy, then their preference for health is suspect 
because it is based on a belief  that is probably false.  Why should we go to 
such great lengths to satisfy preferences that are based on false beliefs? 
Indeed, many desire-based theories of  well-being argue that it is the 
satisfaction of  informed desires that make one’s life go better (Sidgwick 1981: 
110-1). 
 Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) respond to this worry by listing a number 
of  respects in which one can have a rational preference for something that 
won’t increase one’s happiness.  If  we accept Mill’s (1863) distinction 
between higher and lower pleasures, for example, then a cognitive disability 
that led one to replace poetry with push-pin might leave one’s quantity of  
happiness unaffected, while nevertheless making one worse off.  Thus, it 
would be rational to prefer not having the cognitive disability, while 
nevertheless recognizing that such a disability would not make one any less 
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happy.  In addition to the idea of  higher pleasures, Loewenstein and Ubel 
cite the value of  experiencing a range of  emotions, participating in 
meaningful activities, and having a range of  options (even if  one won’t 
exercise those options). 
 Each of  these points potentially helps to justify a preference-based 
concern for some aspects of  health.  But much more argument is needed 
before this sort of  view could ground anything like our current attitudes 
towards health.  The primary problem is that Loewenstein and Ubel’s criteria 
don’t apply to most health problems.   Someone who is blind or a paraplegic 12
or a diabetic, for example, is just as capable as anyone else of  enjoying higher 
pleasures, experiencing a range of  emotions, and engaging in meaningful 
activities.  The only criterion which will be triggered by most health problems 
is the (possible) value of  having a range of  options.  I will return to this 
below. 
 Moller (2011) offers a much narrower version of  the preference-based 
approach.  He accepts that many types of  ill health will have minimal effect 
on one’s happiness and well-being, but nevertheless thinks that it can be 
rational to prefer to avoid disability.  He offers a comparison with love.  I 
might recognize that I would be equally well-off  if  I were married to 
someone other than my wife.  I would (after a period of  adjustment) be just 
as happy, engage in equally meaningful and fulfilling pursuits, and so forth. 
But, despite this, loving my wife means valuing my relationship with her, and 
therefore resisting any change to that relationship (201).  Someone who was 
prepared to sever a relationship simply because an objectively better partner 
came along couldn’t be said to truly love her original partner.  Moller 
suggests that something like this happens in the case of  disability.  As we’ve 
seen, adapting to disability may involve substituting some valuable activities 
(e.g. painting) for others (music).  Truly valuing something, however, means 
being attached to it and therefore resisting anything that would require one to 
give it up.  If  I am a music-lover, I should resist anything that would force me 
to replace it with a different art form.  I can rationally do this while at the 
same time recognizing that after making the switch to painting, I would be 
just as well-off  as I was before. 
 Moller’s argument seems like it could provide an alternative justification 
for some of  our current beliefs about the importance of  health, and it 
catches a wider range of  health problems than Loewenstein and Ubel’s 
suggestions.  Unfortunately, though, in its current form it can’t justify our 
common-sense view of  the importance of  health.  Many resources go 
towards preventing ill health in children, who haven’t yet developed the 
values and attachments upon which Moller’s argument depends. 
 In fairness to Loewenstein and Ubel, their suggestions are intended to address problems raised for 12
public policy by adaptation in many areas of  life — not just health.  The proposals they offer may be 
more useful in those other contexts.
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 It is worth looking, therefore, to a very different response to the 
problem, offered by Hausman and Daniels.  (In what follows, I will gloss 
over the important differences in Hausman’s and Daniels’ views.)  According 
to standard liberal theories of  justice, government should remain neutral on 
the question of  what constitutes a good or valuable life.  Accordingly, it is 
not society’s job to see to the general well-being of  its members; its job is 
instead to provide them with a space in which to live whatever lives they 
choose.  If  this liberal picture of  the proper role of  government is correct, 
then a concern for health should not be based on its impact on well-being, 
since promoting well-being is not the proper aim of  public policy.  Instead,  !
[T]he evaluation of  a health state should depend on the extent to which 
its characteristics and consequences diminish the range of  good lives and 
valuable projects that are available to people. From a public perspective, 
the significance of  bad health lies not in ultimate outcomes, but in the 
extent to which it diminishes capabilities. (Hausman 2010: 287, cf. Daniels 
2007: 27) !
We know that ill health, even if  it doesn’t impact well-being, can nevertheless 
impact the capabilities people have, so this seems like a compelling 
justification for regarding health as a matter of  justice.   
To see what kind of  a concern for health this approach would yield, 
we need to know which “valuable projects” and “range of  good lives” it is 
important for society to make available to people.  As Hausman notes, !
The goal of  social policy is not, however, to expand the range of  activities 
that are available to individuals without reference to the importance of  
the activities. Providing individuals with a wider choice of  religions is 
more important than providing them with a wider selection of  breakfast 
cereals.  (2010: 287) !
This leads to a problem.  How can we declare one set of  projects or range of  
lives more valuable than another, consistent with liberalism?  Aren’t these 
precisely the issues about which the liberal state is supposed to remain 
neutral?   
 Depending on the version of  liberalism one holds, this need not be the 
case.  Perfectionistic versions of  liberalism justify liberal neutrality with 
reference to a substantive account of  value.  According to Raz (1987), for 
example, neutrality follows from the importance of  allowing people to 
autonomously choose from a range of  valuable options.  The state ought to 
remain neutral among the many different ways of  life that are objectively 
valuable, but needn’t be neutral concerning ways of  life that are not 
objectively valuable.  If  religious observance is an important component of  
certain objectively valuable lives, but eating breakfast cereals is not, then the 
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state could justifiably give higher priority to health needs that would conflict 
with religious practice than to health needs that would conflict with eating 
breakfast cereals.  13
 According to political versions of  liberalism, the state is not to appeal to 
a substantive conception of  value, so this solution is not available. 
Nevertheless, a political liberal might still justify a preference for certain ways 
of  life over others, if  that preference was agreed on by all reasonable parties 
— that is, if  it was the subject of  a Rawlsian overlapping consensus (Rawls 
1993: 133-72).  Hausman says that the importance of  an option will be 
relative to a given society, and he expresses optimism that within a society 
there will be broad agreement on such issues (Hausman 2010: 287, cf. Daniels 
2007: 35-36, 50-52).  Perhaps, then, he means to take this route.  Regardless, 
however, the question of  how to determine the importance of  different 
options is a difficult one that neither Hausman nor Daniels has fully resolved. 
 If  something like Hausman’s or Daniels’ proposal is the right way to 
justify making health a concern of  justice, a number of  important 
conclusions follow.  Here, I will briefly mention one, emphasized by 
Hausman (2010; 2015).  Cost-effectiveness analyses are used in many parts 
of  the world to determine what treatments are covered by public insurance 
plans.  These analyses typically measure effectiveness in quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs), interpreted as quantifying the well-being associated with 
various health states.  If  Daniels or Hausman is correct, these analyses are 
measuring effectiveness in the wrong way.  If  we want to continue using 
cost-effectiveness analyses to guide public policy, we need to modify the 
QALY so that, instead of  measuring the well-being associated with health 
states, it instead measures the political value of  the options or activities that 
ill health bars us from.  Hausman (2015: ch. 14) has sketched one way in 
which this might be done, but no system of  this sort has yet been developed 
in detail.  Any such system would constitute a major departure from current 
practices. !!
HEALTH AND ETHICS !
 In addition to raising issues of  justice, health also holds an important 
place in our thinking about personal morality.  Consider, for example, the 
parent-child relationship.  Most of  us believe that parents have a special 
 We could imagine a related view according to which health has intrinsic value because it is 13
intrinsically valuable that people have more options available to them.  (This view could, but need not, 
be liberal.)  In order to avoid running afoul of  some of  the arguments offered earlier, such a view 
would be most plausible if  it allowed that increasing options didn't itself  increase a person's well-being.  
In other words, such a view would say that it is good that Jane is healthy, although it is not necessarily good 
for Jane that she be healthy.  (Sen sometimes sounds like he might hold a view like this.  See e.g. his 
(1999: 189-90).)  I thank Paul Hurley for suggesting this possibility to me.
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obligation to see to the health of  their children.  Parents who allow their 
children to become sick or injured, or who fail to inculcate healthy habits in 
their children, are seen as negligent.  But if  blindness, for example, doesn’t 
significantly reduce well-being, why should we condemn a parent who 
declines to have her newborn treated with erythromycin, an inexpensive eye 
ointment that can prevent infection leading to blindness (Barnes 2009: 347)? 
This is not an idle question.  Some parents with disabilities like deafness and 
achondroplasia (dwarfism) seek to conceive children who share their 
condition.  Fertility clinics face difficult questions about whether to aid them 
in these pursuits (Sanghavi 2006). 
 This puzzle is, of  course, the personal analog of  the political question 
we discussed in the previous section.  Unfortunately, we can’t simply import 
either of  the earlier solutions wholesale.  Preference-based views, like 
Loewenstein’s, Ubel’s, and Moller’s, will run into trouble because children 
frequently will have no well-formed preferences about their health.  If  we 
instead ask what the child would want if  she had a well-formed preference, 
or if  we ask what an advocate for that child would want on her behalf, we 
run into further problems because disabilities can sometimes be identity-
constituting.  A child who grows up with a disability or chronic health 
problem may have experiences so different from those she would have had if  
healthy, that it is plausible to say that she becomes a different person 
(Goering 2008: 129; Shakespeare 2013: 99).  There is thus no clear 
perspective from which to ask what the child would want. 
 Liberal approaches like Daniels’ and Hausman’s are potentially of  more 
use, but they also can’t be directly transposed to this case.  We certainly 
wouldn’t want to say that parents have no obligation to promote their child’s 
well being.  But the other aspect of  the liberal view does seem relevant. 
Parents plausibly have a responsibility to prepare their children for a range of  
possible life plans, rather than narrowly channeling them towards a particular 
career or lifestyle.  Feinberg calls these the “anticipatory autonomy rights” of  
children — or, more eloquently, the “child’s right to an open future” (1992: 
77).  Since ill health closes off  valuable opportunities, this seems a plausible 
way to ground a parental obligation to promote a child’s health. 
 Of  course, as in the political case, there is still the difficulty of  
specifying which possible life plans a parent should try to keep open. 
Preparing a child to pursue one possible career often precludes adequately 
preparing her to pursue another, so we can’t ask parents to keep all options 
open.  Feinberg sometimes writes as if  parents should seek to provide 
children with as many options as possible (1992: 84), but it is unclear what 
this means and why we should value quantity over quality (Archard 2011).  It 
therefore appears that we will have to engage in substantive normative 
reasoning to determine which life plans a parent should try to keep open for 
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her child.   This task looks similar to the one facing Hausman and Daniels in 14
the political sphere, but it is important to recognize that it is distinct.  The 
parent-child relationship is not directly analogous to the government-citizen 
relationship, so there is no reason that the opportunities a parent should 
preserve for her children must be the same as the opportunities a state has an 
obligation to provide for its citizens.  Also, parents have extensive obligations 
to look out for their children’s welfare, whereas states (on the liberal view) 
don’t have a similar obligation to see to the welfare of  their citizens.  That 
suggests that in the parent-child relationship, considerations of  welfare will 
frequently compete with the obligation to maintain an open future.  Given 
both of  these factors, it seems likely that if  we adopt an opportunity-based 
view of  the importance of  health, the health-related obligations of  the state 
may be quite different than the health-related obligations of  parents. !!
CONCLUSION !
 Most people think that health is a significant determinant of  well-being. 
If  you get sick, injured, or disabled, that is a very bad thing for you.  This 
common view is usually correct when it comes to conditions that involve 
significant pain or that cause death.  But many kinds of  ill health primarily or 
exclusively affect us by restricting our capabilities.  When it comes to this sort 
of  health problem, we have good reason to believe that the common view is 
often wrong.  Many conditions of  this sort appear to have a relatively small 
impact on well-being, at least once a person has had time to adapt to her 
situation.  More research needs to be done, especially to determine how well 
people adapt to specific health states, but the results so far suggest that we 
need to rethink our stance towards health, at both the individual and societal 
level.  There may be ways to justify the strong interest that we take in 
preventing and treating non-painful, non-fatal pathologies, but those 
justifications will have to look very different from the well-being-based 
justifications that are usually offered, and in any case they have yet to be fully 
explored. !!!!!
 Ebels-Duggan (forthcoming) argues for a similar claim, discussing a Feinberg-type view in the context 14
of  education.  In order to distinguish the issues on which we may appropriately aim to teach our 
children a particular view (e.g. the theory of  gravity, the wrongness of  gratuitous murder) from the 
issues on which we should aim to have them make up their own minds (e.g. the desirability of  certain 
occupations), she argues that we must make substantive normative judgments.
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